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Abstract—Neural Networks are currently one of the most
widely deployed machine learning algorithms. In particular,
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), are gaining popularity
and are evaluated for deployment in safety critical applications
such as self driving vehicles. Modern CNNs feature enormous
memory bandwidth and high computational needs, challenging
existing hardware platforms to meet throughput, latency and
power requirements. Functional safety and error tolerance need
to be considered as additional requirement in safety critical
systems. In general, fault tolerant operation can be achieved by
adding redundancy to the system, which is further exacerbating
the computational demands. Furthermore, the question arises
whether pruning and quantization methods for performance
scaling turn out to be counterproductive with regards to fail
safety requirements. In this work we present a methodology
to evaluate the impact of permanent faults affecting Quantized
Neural Networks (QNNs) and how to effectively decrease their
effects in hardware accelerators. We use FPGA-based hardware
accelerated error injection, in order to enable the fast evaluation.
A detailed analysis is presented showing that QNNs containing
convolutional layers are by far not as robust to faults as
commonly believed and can lead to accuracy drops of up to
10%. To circumvent that, we propose two different methods to
increase their robustness: 1) selective channel replication which
adds significantly less redundancy than used by the common
triple modular redundancy and 2) a fault-aware scheduling of
processing elements for folded implementations.
Index Terms—neural networks, safety, automotive, FPGA,
quantized neural networks
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to use an electronic device in a safety critical
application, its dependability must be evaluated, usually com-
posed of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety
(RAMS). The functional safety analysis and its evaluation is
regulated by standards depending on the application domain
(e.g., IEC-61508 for industrial systems, ISO-26262 for road
vehicles and EN 50126/8/9 for rail transport), with safety
levels proportional to the criticality of the application. Failure
modes, effects, and diagnostic analysis (FMEDA) [1] have to
be evaluated for each of the components of a design in order
to model the system’s safety features.
Within machine learning, deep learning and especially
CNNs have recently gained major visibility due to their
high accuracy in many computer vision tasks. Nonetheless,
their algorithm complexity is associated with enormous com-
pute and memory requirements. Significant efforts have been
made, tackling the inherent redundancy of neural networks
by means of weights and synapse pruning, using less inten-
sive layers (depth-wise separable convolution [2]) and non-
arithmetic layers (e.g., ShiftNet [3]) or applying parameter
quantization [4]. Many of those techniques require ad-hoc
hardware back-ends to fully exploit the optimization strategies,
making programmable devices like Field Programmable Gate
Arrays (FPGAs) and Adaptive Compute Acceleration Plat-
forms (ACAPs) very interesting implementation targets due
to their reconfigurability and flexibility. Additionally, the pro-
grammability of FPGAs enables hardware architecture changes
to customize the application demands, making those devices
appealing for safe implementations of hardware accelerators.
The need for dependable electronic systems in safety critical
applications has led to the need for fast, reliable and affordable
methodologies to assess and measure safety. In this paper
we present hardware accelerated error injection for quantized
neural networks. The main contributions of this paper are:
• High confidence, bit-accurate and high-speed error injec-
tion by means of FPGA implementations;
• Two orthogonal methodologies for deriving optimized
hardware implementations for guaranteed worst-case ac-
curacy drops in case of single errors.
II. RELATED WORK
Multiple recent works are trying to assess the safety of
neural networks, especially targeting autonomous driving sys-
tems [5]. To evaluate the safety level, fault or error injection
can be used to get precise diagnostic coverage data but
requires much more power in terms of computation, usually
resorting to software simulation or hardware emulation. In
order to overcome this problem, Bosio et al. [6] proposed the
adoption of statistical permanent fault injection to decrease
the computational needs, at the expense of confidence in
the measured diagnostic coverage. Gehr et al. [7] rely on
abstract interpretation to model neural network layers, in order
to perform error injection at higher abstraction levels, thus
decreasing the simulation time. In [8], a framework for bit-
level error injection in the memory subsystem in Keras is
presented, showing a 12% difference in resilience analysis978-1-5386-8398-9/18$31.00 ©2019 IEEE
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Fig. 1. Output channels folding in FINN
with respect to an hardware implementation for a multi-layer
perceptron. Multiple works are targeting soft-errors only, either
by performing software emulation [9] or by mean of neutron
beam testing [10], proving some inherent resilience of neural
networks. Even when heavily quantized, CNNs still provide
some built-in fault tolerance, as shown by Nunez-Yanez et
al. [11] while the system is stressed under Dynamic Voltage
Scaling (DVS) and Dynamic Frequency Scaling (DFS).
III. BACKGROUND
A. Neural Network Acceleration and Scheduling
CNNs are usually composed of a sequence of layers, each
with its characteristics in terms of feature map sizes, channels
and filters. We refer the readers to [12]–[14] for an exhaustive
list of CNN accelerators targeting programmable logic. In this
paper, we adopted the QNNs accelerator, code-named FINN,
and described in [15], [16] which are publicly available at [17].
CNN hardware accelerators consist in general of an array of
Processing Elements (PEs) on which layers or portion of layers
are scheduled to be executed in sequence, with the network
parameters either residing on-chip or in external memory.
Whenever a single PE is faulty, it is thus going to affect
multiple outputs both within the layer or among layers. The
portion of the network affected by the corrupted PE depends
on the scheduling of the neural network. For FINN, due to the
data flow structure instantiating one compute block per layer
(with multiple PEs per compute block) a single faulty PE will
affect results of a single layer. This is visualized in Figure 1,
which shows a case in which 3 PEs are instantiated to compute
6 output channels of a layer. The ratio between channels and
PEs gives the number of clock cycles required for computing
an output pixel and is defined as the folding factor f , in this
case f = 6/3 = 2.
B. Error Injection Model
In general, QNNs are using potentially different precisions
for their weights W and activations A, denoted in the fol-
lowing as WwAa, where w and a are the respective bit
widths. Depending on the activation precision, neurons can
attain different activation stages which we are injecting. The
evaluated networks are thereby all using symmetric activations
around zero. Thus, assuming a ternary activations network
(i.e., a = 2), activations can have a value out of {-1, 0, 1},
which is equal to the possible stuck-at errors in our error
injection context using this precision. When setting neurons
in the network to stuck-at values, we are thus always injecting
a bits at once.
IV. ERROR INJECTION METHODOLOGY
The adopted implementation of the FINN [15] compute
data path, as an example of a typical CNN compute fabric, is
based on data flow implementations of all the neural network
layers. Each layer is built upon a Matrix-Vector Threshold Unit
(MVTU) performing the computation. The MVTU consists
of an array of multiply and accumulate engines performing
the matrix-vector multiplication, and a thresholding block.
This is shown in Figure 2. The thresholding block performs
a comparison between the accumulation results and a set
of thresholds, which are computed at design time by fusing
biases, batch-normalization and activation quantization [15].
Since batch-normalization and biases, as resulted from train-
ing, are different for each OFM channel, a different set of
thresholds has to be computed for each channel. In detail,
the activation within an MVTU is performed by accumulating
the results of
∑N
i=1(val > thi), where val is the result of
the matrix-vector accumulation operation and thi is each of
the computed thresholds. Assuming a fully binarized network
(W1A1), it is possible to inject stuck-at 1 (s@1) and stuck-
at -1 (s@-1) errors by setting those threshold values during
run-time. We refer as s@-1 for BNN since -1 is the logical
value of 0 in a BNN. A s@-1 can be implemented by fixing
the th to thmax where thmax is a value which is bigger than
any input can reach. Thus, the activation is never performed.
Similarly, s@1 can be implemented by fixing the th to −thmax.
The accumulation will always be greater than the regarding
threshold. In case of multiple bit output, it is possible to fix
the result activation to any possible value by fixing as many
thresholds as needed to −thmax and the others to thmax.
In all of the following analysis experiments, we decided to
use the overall accuracy of the neural network as a figure
of merit, measured by running inference on the complete
testset (10,000 images, as used during training to validate
accuracy) in the error-injected system. We are evaluating
two different topologies, namely CNV (trained on CIFAR-10)
and LFC (trained on MNIST), as introduced in FINN [15].
The networks are implemented with different precisions for
weights activations to analyze accuracy and error tolerance
with the precision. LFC is a multi-layer perceptron (MLP)
with 3 fully connected layers while CNV is a CNN with
6 convolutional layers, 3 max pooling layers and 3 fully
connected layers.
As shown in [18], neuron error (stuck-at) is one of the
common error models for feed-forward artificial neural net-
works. This model perfectly applies to fully connected layers,
in which a single error will effect a single output pixel,
being the output a single dimensional feature map. Expanding
on the concept to CNNs, a neuron stuck-at will affect a
complete output channel of a layer. We refer to error injection
instead of fault injection since we fix the activations of a
whole output channel to one of the possible activations values.
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This means that, for multi-bit activations, multiple faults are
actually injected.
V. GENERIC MODEL OPTIMIZATION
A. Analysis of Stuck-At Errors
The goal of the generic model analysis is to evaluate the
tolerance of the neural network itself, without considering
the actual specifics of a given hardware architecture and the
associated compute schedule of the layers and channels.
As explained in Section IV, we run experiments and eval-
uate accuracy when a complete output feature map (OFMap)
channel (ofm chan) of a layer is stuck-at a fixed value, as
shown in Figure 2. For each output channel a set of thresholds
is evaluated. In order to perform error injection on a complete
channel, it is sufficient to fix the related threshold values as
explained in Section IV.
Tables I and II list the results of the injection campaign per-
formed on LFC and CNV, respectively, at multiple precisions.
For each network precision, we list the minimum accuracy
achieved with one of the channel stuck-at experiments, as well
as the maximum among all channels. For the fully binarized
neural network, as shown in the first row of both tables, we
report results of injection of s@−1 and s@1 having a binary
representation of 0 and 1, respectively. When a higher bitwidth
is used for activations, as in W1A2 and W2A2, we perform
injection for each of the possible values of the activation. In
the 2-bit activation case (actually ternary due to symmetric
quantization) we inject the values −1, 0 and +1, having a
binary representations of 11, 00 and 01, respectively.
From the LFC results in Table I, the overall accuracy is only
slightly impacted, for all tested precisions, showing a worst-
case accuracy drop of only 0.09 % in the W2A2 case for
s@−1. This is mainly due to the fact that only fully connected
layers are used which are inherently very redundant and able
to easily tolerate a single neuron generating error results.
The situation changes significantly when the network con-
tains convolutional layers like for CNV as shown in Table II.
For the W1A1 case, accuracy will drop by 6.21% when
channel 23 of layer 1 is s@1 leading to an overall worst-case
TABLE I
WHOLE CHANNEL STUCK-AT EFFECTS ON LFC-W1A1, LFC-W1A2 AND
LFC-W2A2 NETWORKS (TRAINED ON MNIST)
Accuracy in %
Net Err. single s@−1 single s@0 single s@1
free min max min max min max
W1A1 98.40 98.33 98.46 – – 98.33 98.45
W1A2 98.49 98.44 98.55 98.45 98.54 98.43 98.55
W2A2 98.53 98.44 98.57 98.46 98.55 98.46 98.55
TABLE II
WHOLE CHANNEL STUCK-AT EFFECTS ON CNV-W1A1, CNV-W1A2 AND
CNV-W2A2 NETWORKS (TRAINED ON CIFAR-10)
Accuracy in %
Net Err. single s@−1 single s@0 single s@1
free min max min max min max
W1A1 79.22 75.30 79.76 – – 73.01 79.69
W1A2 82.66 73.81 83.24 79.91 83.18 71.85 83.11
W2A2 84.29 74.80 84.68 82.44 84.69 74.18 84.76
accuracy (min column) of 73.01%. Here, a single channel can
be identified that has a significant effect to the overall accuracy
of the system. Even higher accuracy drops can be noticed at
higher precisions. As expected, the higher the precision, the
more accurate is the error free network. On the other hand,
CNV-W1A2 shows a worst-case accuracy drop of 10.81% in
layer 2, with an accuracy of 71.85% which is even lower
than the worst-case for W1A1 (73.01%). This higher drop can
be explained by the fact that, virtually, the error injection of
s@−1 consists of 2 concurrent faults in the coding at bit level.
However, increasing the weight precision to 2 bits instead
achieves, as expected, a slightly better worst-case accuracy
of 74.18% (drop of 10.11%) compared to CNV-W1A2.
Interestingly, in each network it is possible to identify
complete channels which, when fixed to a certain value,
actually show higher accuracy (max column) than the baseline.
As an example, fixing the output channel 2 of layer 0 to value
1 in the W1A1 case would increase the overall accuracy of the
network by 0.54%. This shows that, despite the quantization,
the neural network still contains redundancy, maybe due to
overfitting or limitations in training. Channel pruning could
be applied to those neural networks without loss in accuracy
and without the need of retraining but this is out of the scope
of this paper.
It can be concluded that QNNs containing convolutional
layers are by far not as robust to faults as commonly believed.
A single neuron stuck-at at the wrong place can cause accuracy
drops of up to 10% which may not be tolerable in a safety
critical application.
B. Robustness Optimization by Selective Channel Replication
In safety critical applications, fault-tolerant systems rely
on the addition of redundancy, e.g., using Triple Modular
Redundancy (TMR) to achieve the desired safety integrity
TABLE III
NUMBER OF CHANNELS TO BE TRIPLICATED AND OPERATION OVERHEAD IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A CERTAIN WORST-CASE ACCURACY DROP
CNV-W1A1 CNV-W1A2 CNV-W2A2 CNV-W4A4
layer type channels ≥ 0.5% ≥ 1% ≥ 2% ≥ 0.5% ≥ 1% ≥ 2% ≥ 0.5% ≥ 1% ≥ 2% ≥ 0.5% ≥ 1% ≥ 2%
#
ch
an
n
el
s
to
tr
ip
. 0 conv 64 17 7 2 12 8 1 19 10 3 5 0 0
1 conv 64 63 51 24 64 59 38 64 61 38 62 57 33
2 conv 128 106 80 35 121 109 71 120 106 73 114 96 67
3 conv 128 113 75 9 125 116 82 124 115 80 123 116 93
4 conv 256 87 8 0 168 58 3 142 36 1 160 37 3
5 fc 256 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 fc 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 fc 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ops overhead when trip.
req. ch. [%]
173.47 129.70 49.87 186.24 167.65 109.49 185.24 168.86 109.36 179.63 159.60 104.96
level. Clearly, TMR adds an overhead of 200%. To avoid
this, we propose selective channel replication as a method
to increase the error tolerance by triplicating only the critical
channels. This is performed by first identifying the channels of
the neural network that cause accuracy drops which are below
a certain threshold. Next, only those channels are replicated
using TMR.
Table III lists, for multiple network precision bit widths,
how many channels, when affected by a channel s@, would
incur a worst-case accuracy drop of more than 0.5%, 1% or 2%
in presence of a single error. The last row shows the percentage
of operational overhead (counted in number of multiply and
accumulation operations) in case of triplicating the channels
which would ensure a worst-case accuracy drop that is lower
or equal to the given thresholds. As it can be noticed, the
lower the tolerated worst-case drop, the higher the amount of
overhead, but in all cases the overhead is always smaller than
the 200% given for a full implementation of TMR. Giving
the results of the error injection, it is possible to evaluate how
many channels need TMR in order to achieve a desired single-
error worst-case accuracy, leading to minimal increase in the
total number of operations.
C. Cost Analysis of Selective Channel Replication
In this section, we analyze the trade-off between accuracy
and hardware cost across a spectrum of precisions. For this,
we adopted the hardware cost model for High-Level Synthesis
designs for MAC blocks, as explained in [16], using the
formula 1.6 · w · a, where w and a are, again, the bit widths
for weights and activations, respectively. The resulting design
space is shown in Figure 3. For each precision, the relationship
between the hardware cost and the worst-case error rate in
presence of a single error is shown. The optimal compromises
in the design space will be located on the Pareto frontier.
Interestingly, each one of the precisions in the CNV net-
works on CIFAR-10 have entry points into the Pareto optimal
curve. If the tolerated worst-case error rate is higher than
21.8%, the completely binarized solution is the optimal solu-
tion. However, when more channels in the binarized network
require triplication to achieve the desired worst-case error rate,
then the network with 2 activation bits becomes optimal. As
expected, for high worst-case accuracy requirements, the so-
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Fig. 3. Pareto frontier of single error-tolerant worst-case test error vs.
hardware cost
lutions with higher precision for both weights and activations
provide the best (and only) solution.
VI. HARDWARE-SPECIFIC OPTIMIZATION
Section V showed results of error injection and analyzed the
cost of selective triplication. The study was based on the as-
sumption that the neural network accelerator uses parallelism
enabling a permanent fault in a PE to affect only a limited
portion of a single channel in a single layer. Nonetheless, in an
overlay architecture, it is more likely that a portion of the same
layer or multiple layers are physically executed on the same
PE. Thus, the presence of a single fault in that PE would affect
multiple aspects of the complete neural network, depending
on the actual scheduling of the neural network on the array of
PEs. In this section, we try to explore the effects of a single
defective PE evaluating multiple portions of a layer as shown
in Figure 1, first by analyzing the scheduling proposed in [15].
A. Analysis of Stuck-At Errors
In the default schedule of FINN [15], consecutive channels
are computed by consecutive PEs. Channel c is computed
in PE = c mod #PE. In case of a folding factor f =
#Channels/#PEs = 2, with 64 channels and 32 PEs, the first
PE will compute channel 0 and channel 32, while the second
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u
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Average
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Fig. 4. Worst-case accuracy with different folding factors on CNV-W1A1
showing layer 0 stuck-at 0 for 64 channels and 64. . . 2 PEs.
PE will compute channels 1 and 33 (and so on). Figure 4
shows the accuracy whenever one PE is s@0 in layer 0 of the
CNV-W1A1 network and assuming different folding factors
for scheduling, listing both the average accuracy among all
faulty PEs as well as the difference between the maximum and
minimum achieved accuracy. As expected, when increasing
the folding factor (decreasing the number of PEs) the average
accuracy drop increases as a larger portion of the layer result
being corrupt by the faulty PE. Furthermore, the accuracy drop
depends on which specific channels are executed on the faulty
PE, making the worst-case accuracy results being schedule-
dependent. It is possible to minimize overall accuracy drop
by finding and using the optimal scheduling of channels for a
given number of PEs through this analysis as will be analyzed
in greater detail below.
B. Robustness Optimization by Scheduling
As explained above, it is necessary to analyze the effects
when combinations of output channels are faulty. To illustrate
this, Figure 5 shows the achieved accuracy when one PE for
two output channels (folding factor f = 2) is s@0, here
evaluated for layer 0 of CNV-W1A1. For each combination
of two channels, which are assumed to be executed on the
same PE, the resulting accuracy in case of a single faulty
PE is presented, having the first channel on the abscissa and
the second channel on the ordinate. The worst-case accuracy
in case of a single faulty PE with the default scheduling is
74.82%, indicated with ⋄ in Figure 5. That would be the case
if PE30 computing channels 30 and 62 is s@0. By analyzing
the complete 2-D space in Figure 5, it is possible to identify
that mapping the calculation of channels 24 and 38 onto the
same PE would lead to the even worse single-error accuracy
of only 66.86%.
As it is possible to simply reorder the channels, this allows
to optimize the schedule for higher error-tolerance. To be
more precise, it is possible to find the optimal scheduling for
providing the most error-tolerant behaviour towards single cor-
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Fig. 5. Analysis of different mappings of the computations of two channels
to one faulty PE in layer 0 using a folding factor of 2 (32 PEs, 64 channels).
rupt PEs. For that, the following Integer Linear Programming
(ILP) model was used to find the schedule that maximizes the
accuracy, which is explained in the following:
maximize minacc
subject to
C1:
N−1∑
j=0,j 6=i
smin(i,j),max(i,j) = 1
∀ i = 0 . . .N − 1
C2: (1− sij)Macc + si,jEi,j ≥ minacc
∀ i = 0 . . .N − 1, j = 0 . . . i− 1
minacc ∈ R, si,j ∈ {0, 1}
The formulation considers a single corrupt PE using the data
from the combined error injection analysis and maximizes the
minimal accuracy minacc when a PE is corrupt. For that, the
Boolean variable si,j is used, which is one, when channel
i and j out of N channels are scheduled on the same PE.
As si,j is equal to sj,i per definition, we define i < j to
avoid redundancy and to achieve a less complex formulation.
Now, any channel i can be scheduled onto a PE with any
other channel j 6= i, but every channel can only be scheduled
once. This is realized by constraint C1. Here min(i, j) and
max(i, j) are used to achieve i < j. Constraint C2 formulates
the minimal accuracy for the scheduling. The constant Ei,j
is the accuracy, when channel i and j are scheduled on
the same PE and that PE is defect. Macc is the highest
accuracy the network can achieve when a PE in the layer is
corrupt. When the variable si,j is zero, C2 is fulfilled because
Macc ≥ minacc. When si,j is one, which means that channel i
and j are scheduled on the same PE, the constraint becomes
Eij ≥ minacc which prevents minacc from getting lower than
possible. Note that Ei,j and Macc are the number of correct
classifications of the evaluation set with 10.000 images. If we
want to maximize the accuracy for s@0 and s@1 together, we
can set Ei,j to min(E
0
i,j , E
1
i,j), where E
0
i,j and E
1
i,j are the
s@0 and s@1 accuracies, respectively. The given formulation
is for a folding factor of 2 but can easily be adopted for higher
folding factors.
The resulting mapping of channels to PEs of the optimal
schedule are marked with a ⋆ in Figure 5, while the default
schedule is marked with a ⋄. The optimal schedule achieves
a worst-case accuracy of 76.70%, which is an increase of
1.88% with respect to the default scheduling. Reordering the
scheduling of channels just means rearranging the weights of
the network and comes at no additional hardware overhead,
making it an appealing solution. Nonetheless, there is no easy
way to estimate the accuracy for each combination of channels
mapped on a faulty PE.
The analysis relies on time consuming error injection cam-
paigns, in which each possible combination of channels is s@
each possible value. The number of experiments also heavily
increases with the number of channels c and folding factor f :
#experiments =
(
c
f
)
=
c!
f ! · (c− f)!
For example, with f = 4 and c = 64, 635,276 experiments are
needed for each injected value. FPGA hardware acceleration,
in case of W1A1 using a Xilinx ZCU104 board (XCZU7EV)
running at 300MHz, achieves 32,880 frames per second. This
implementation enables ∼3 experiments per second, finishing
the characterization in ∼59 hours. This is 5.8× faster than
running Theano using an NVIDIA P40 where the overall
campaign took more then 14 days.
To conclude, the worst-case accuracy can be further in-
creased by additionally using the Selective Channel Repli-
cation method proposed in Section V-B. However, when the
PEs computing M out of the N channels are replicated, the
scheduling should be adjusted to consider only the remaining
N −M channels.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a methodology to characterize
and systematically increase the robustness of QNNs with an
FPGA-accelerated error injection analysis and two orthogonal
methods for robustness optimization. The FPGA-accelerated
error characterization enables the fast identification of the
most susceptible channels. Here, our experiments showed that
QNNs with convolutional layers are less robust to single
faults than commonly believed. As a countermeasure, the
information retrieved from the analysis can be used to decide
which channels have to be replicated to achieve a given level
of error-tolerance in the generic model. This allows to trade
robustness against hardware complexity leading to significant
resource reductions compared to common TMR schemes. In
the common case when PEs compute multiple channels, we
showed how scheduling influences the robustness and pro-
posed an ILP model that finds the optimal schedule regarding
single-fault robustness without any hardware overhead. Future
work will analyze modeling of hardware errors during training
to train error-tolerant neural networks, as well as generalizing
the injection tool to model single-event upsets (SEU).
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